Abstract
This essay engages the debate concerning the so-called ‘Scotist rupture’ from the point of view of Christology. The essay investigates John Duns Scotus’s development of Christological doctrine against the strong Cyrilline tendencies of Thomas Aquinas. In particular the essay explores how Scotus’s innovative doctrine of the ‘haecceity’ of Christ’s human nature entailed a self-sufficing conception of the ‘person’, having to do less with the mystery of rationality and ‘communion’, and more to do with a quasi-voluntaristic ‘power’ over oneself. In this light, Scotus’s Christological development is read as suggestively contributing to make possible a proto-liberal condition in which ‘agency’ (agere) and ‘right’ (ius) are construed as determinative of what it means to be and act as a person.

Keywords
John Duns Scotus, ‘Scotist rupture’, Thomas Aquinas, homo assumptus Christology

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Christology and the ‘Scotist Rupture’
Introduction

In *A Secular Age*, Charles Taylor links the movement towards the self-sufficing ‘exclusive humanism’ characteristic of modern secularism with a reallocation of popular piety in the thirteenth century. During that period a shift occurred in which devotional practices became less focused on the cosmological glory of Christ Pantocrator and more focused on the particular humanity of the lowly Jesus. Taylor suggests that this new devotional attention to the particular human Christ was facilitated by the recently founded mendicant orders, especially the Franciscans and Dominicans, both of whom saw the meekness of God Incarnate reflected in the individual poor among whom the friars lived and ministered. In this context, a new spiritual attention to the human individuality of Jesus was manifest, whether in the realism of the paintings of Giotto (so deeply associated with Franciscan spirituality), or in the new liturgical feasts centred on the suffering body of Christ, such as the feast of the Five Wounds and that of the Sacred Heart of Jesus (both of which were first celebrated in the thirteenth century by German Dominicans).²

The new devotional focus on the individual human Christ, in principle, confirmed and did not contradict orthodox Chalcedonianism, that in the Incarnation the divine Logos hypostatically assumed a fully human nature as his own. Already in the early eighth century John of Damascus held that the human nature assumed in Christ was assumed in atomo, that is, in individual form.³ The hypostatic union was thus construed to have occurred in the assumption of this human nature and not of human nature in the abstract. Nevertheless, the new spiritual focus occasioned by the mendicants’ piety drew fresh attention to the paradox of the relation of the universal and the particular, unity and difference, in the doctrine of the hypostatic union of the divine Logos of all things incarnated in a particular human being.

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³ John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* 3.11 (PG 94.1024A).
In this devotional context, Dominican Christology in the person of St Thomas Aquinas recommitted itself to affirming the traditional priority of the universal over the particular even within this new focus of piety on the particular humanity of Jesus. For Aquinas, in Cyril-line fashion, whatever particular ‘humanness’ there is in Jesus, this particularity ‘is’ only in virtue of the hypostatic union: even while Christ assumed a human nature \textit{in atomo}, the term of individuation of this human nature resides wholly in the divine filiation of the eternal Son.\textsuperscript{4} Thus, even while Jesus is a particular human \textit{(in atomo)}, nevertheless, he is not a human \textit{suppositum} – he ‘is’ the Logos of God.\textsuperscript{5} In this way Dominican Christology remained highly paradoxical. Franciscan Christology, by contrast, tended to confront the perceived aporia more directly, ambitiously rethinking the ontological status of the particular humanity of the Incarnate Son.\textsuperscript{6} This can perhaps already be seen in St Bonaventure, who reconceived the status of the traditional \textit{rationes aeternae} (the universal Platonic forms) as residing fully ‘in’ the individuated human nature of Jesus.\textsuperscript{7} By contrast, the traditional conception of the \textit{rationes aeternae} had tended to understand them, not so much ‘in’ the individuated human Jesus, but rather ‘in’ the person of the universal Logos (as Maximus the Confessor would have it, the many \textit{logoi} are the one Logos and the one Logos is the many \textit{logoi}).\textsuperscript{8}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{4} Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} III, q. 4, a. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{5} Cf. Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} III q. 4, a. 2, ad 1; ad 2; and a. 5 ad 2.
\item \textsuperscript{7} See Bonaventure, \textit{In Sententias} I, dist. 3, pt. 1, q. 1, ad 5.
\item \textsuperscript{8} For the doctrine of the \textit{logoi} in the Logos, see Maximus the Confessor, \textit{Ambiguum} 7 (PG 91.1068D-1101C). The consequences of Bonaventure’s reconception of the \textit{rationes aeternae} is beyond the scope of this essay; however, Louis Dupré has suggested that it is precisely from henceforth that devotion to the particular ‘human Jesus’ could now in principle elide speculative knowledge in favour of knowledge of a concrete particular. The result of this shift, on Dupré’s view, is that cognition now comes to consist ‘in uniting a created image with its personal archetype, Christ, the synthesis of all ideas’ (\textit{Passage to Modernity}, p. 38). Thus Dupré suggests that the divine paradigms came to reside ‘in’ a particular such that they could now be ‘grasped’ in a way hitherto unconceivable. Under this condition knowledge could be reconfigured away from the mystical path of ‘stretching towards’ the abstract uncircumscribability of the universal, towards ‘grasping’ the singularity of circumscribed particulars. This situation is connected to how Lydia Schumacher, in another context, has suggested that illumination in Bonaventure, far from being simply an Augustinian renewal, is in fact a significant innovation on Augustine’s
\end{itemize}
The daring innovation occurred, however, not with Bonaventure, but a generation after him, when Bl John Duns Scotus posed a question for which Aquinas – inhabiting the high paradox of his doctrine of the Incarnation – had no need to raise: How can a divine person assume a human nature without assuming its normal human suppositum? That is, how does Christ assume a human nature in atomo without assuming the ontological conditions of a particular human person?

Boldly raising this perplexity at the heart of the traditional doctrine of the hypostatic union, Scotus sought to resolve it by granting new ontological significance to the particular human nature of the Incarnate Son, while attempting at the same time to clarify the terms in which this particular human nature nevertheless failed to be a person or possess its own suppositum. This article concerns the solution Scotus offered to the legitimate perplexity he raised. In this article I will argue that, even while Scotus’s perplexity was legitimate, his manner of resolving it risked transforming devotional attention to the individual Christ into a means of underwriting a subjective self-sufficiency based
on a construal of the person as an exigency of the self to act on his or her own initiative. In other words, Scotus’s solution, it would seem, contributed to ‘make possible’ a Christian construal of the person in terms of an autonomy of the self in ‘affective-volitional and cognitive relations with God and others’. To this end, the essay aims at a Christological contribution to the emerging theological consensus concerning what Olivier Boulnois has termed the ‘Scotist rupture’.

THE SCOTIST RUPTURE

Following the provocative study of Étienne Gilson, a diverse company of theologians have come to identify Duns Scotus as a transitional figure in the move towards a ‘proto-liberal’ or ‘proto-secular’ construal of created being and the exigency of the creature to act autonomously.


Central to conceiving this ‘Scotist rupture’ is the option of Scotus on behalf of a univocal conception of being. Following Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), Scotus held that metaphysics is the science of being qua being (ens in quantum ens).\textsuperscript{13} Beyond Ibn Sīnā, Scotus specified for himself that ‘being’ ought to signify the fundamental concept of whatever ‘is’ in its ‘minimal common structure’\textsuperscript{14} – that is, ‘being’, for Scotus, is prior conceptually to every distinction of being, including the distinction that maintains between God and creatures.\textsuperscript{15} In this way, Scotus sought to articulate a metaphysical vision that could be construed in contradiction to the ‘analogical’ view of Thomas Aquinas.\textsuperscript{16} It is not that Scotus held that God and creatures ‘are’ in exactly the same sense; he did not. And therefore he did not hold that being itself is univocal. Rather for Scotus, if we are to think ‘metaphysically’, then we must conceptualise being in a mode that is univocal to all things that ‘are’. Within the realm of metaphysical speculation, therefore, Scotus held


\textsuperscript{13} See Duns Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3.


\textsuperscript{15} On the link between Ibn Sīnā and Scotus, which is traced back to a more fundamental source in Plotinus’s conception of the One, see Cunningham, \textit{Genealogy of Nihilism}, pp. 3–20.

\textsuperscript{16} See Anthony Levi, \textit{Renaissance and Reformation: The Intellectual Genesis} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 30–67; and Frederick Charles Copleston SJ, \textit{History of Philosophy}, vol. 2 (New York: Image Books, 1993), pp. 476–551. Whatever our judgement, Scotus did not criticise the analogical position for its own sake, but rather ‘in order (as he saw it) to safeguard, as he believed, the objectivity of knowledge. Similarly, if he insisted on the univocal character of the concept of being, he did so because he considered his own doctrine to be absolutely necessary if agnosticism were to be avoided, that is, in order to safeguard the objective character of natural theology’ (Copleston, \textit{History of Philosophy}, vol. 2, p. 484). On Scotus’s univocal conception of being, see Douglas C. Langston, ‘Scotus and Ockham on the Univocal Concept of Being’, \textit{Franciscan Studies} 39 (1979), pp. 105–129.
that all things that ‘are’ – including God – must objectively fall under the unity of conceptual being. This meant, from a metaphysical point of view, that when we say God ‘is’ we should do so without needing to recognise that he is either ‘infinite’ or the creator of the universe.

Rudi te Velde has shown how Scotus’s univocal conception of being differs from the analogical vision of Aquinas in two crucial ways. First, while Aquinas likewise understands metaphysics as the science of \textit{ens in quantum ens}, his understanding of ‘being’ nevertheless differs from Scotus to the extent that he understands being in terms of \textit{actus essendi}. This means that, for Aquinas, having being is ‘being in act’, which means that whatever ‘is’ – insofar as it has ‘being’ – manifests some degree of perfection related to the fullness of being itself, the \textit{actus purus} which is the source of being. Attendant to this first difference is a second: for Aquinas the consideration of \textit{ens in quantum ens} ‘does not prescind from the difference between infinite and finite being’.

On the analogical view, what ultimately distinguishes created being from God is ‘participation’. God alone is self-subsisting, while creatures ‘are’ insofar as they live, move and have their being in the one who is himself the source of all being (cf. Acts 17.28). Creatures are not understood as ‘fixed’ self-sustaining substances, but as existences subsisting through an anteriorly receptive participation in and to the gift of God, the ‘infinite and indeterminate sea of substance’ (\textit{pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum}). What distinguishes God and creatures thus is the fact that God simply ‘is’ while creatures ‘are’ only through the continuous and sustaining gift of God himself. On the univocalist view, by contrast, what pre-eminently differentiates God and creation is an ‘intensity’ of being possessed by a particular being of which the gulf between ‘infinite’ and ‘finite’ is maximal. In this way, the

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17 te Velde, ‘Metaphysics and the Question of Creation: Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus and Us’, p. 79.
18 te Velde, ‘Metaphysics and the Question of Creation: Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus and Us’, p. 79.
univocalist view – conceptually reducing being to ‘the bare fact of existence’
– tends to weaken the sense of created being as ‘participating’ in God. Or, to put it otherwise: on the analogical view the being of the creature and God is logically non-contrastive, since the creature exists precisely to the measure of its relational dependence upon the existence of God; while on the univocalist view the being of God and of creatures tends to be construed contrastively, to the extent that the creature’s participational existence in relation to God is no longer understood as the definitive term of the difference of created being as such. The ‘univocity’ Scotus proposed as a mere ‘conceptual scheme’ within the realm of metaphysical science, thus tends to colonise our view of reality, morphing from a purely ‘logical’ and/or ‘semantic’ claim (as it was for Scotus) into an ontological claim about the nature of reality itself (as it became for post-modern atheist ‘Scotists’). The ‘univocity of being’ is thus, as Conor Cunningham describes it, the ‘pregnant implication’ of what Scotus intended and formulated as a merely conceptual stance. This ‘pregnant implication’ has led both Scotus’s theological detractors and his atheistic champions alike to maintain that his univocalist reconception of being is the organic condition of the possibility of ‘bracketing of God’.22


21 Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism, p. 20. Cunningham’s analysis of the ‘pregnant implication’ of Scotus’s conceptual univocity of being is attentive to the subtle way Scotus is not yet proposing univocity as a mode of being in which God and creatures exist in the same way (this, rather, is the ‘pregnant implication’ of Scotus’s conceptual shift, to be completed by later generations). Cunningham’s careful distinction is essentially convertible with the judgement of Kevin Hart: ‘Contrary to what many critics say, Scotus did not contend that there is no difference between the being of God and the being of creation. Only God exists by virtue of his essence, Scotus teaches, and we exist only because we participate in God. Without a universal idea of being [i.e. the univocal conception that entails a ‘pregnant implication’], we could not prove the existence of God: we would always be in search of some way of holding together infinite and finite being in our minds. The Thomist school fiercely disagreed with the Franciscan teacher, and insisted that there is no universal idea of being, only an analogy of being between God and his creatures’ (Postmodernism: A Beginner’s Guide [Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2004], p. 134).

22 See Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Continuum, 2004), esp. pp. 44–52. The most important recent extension of Deleuze’s use of the immanentism Scotus made possible is that of Alberto
The placement of the figure of Scotus at the heart of this dissociation of sensibility should not be construed as an *ad hominem* indictment of a man the Church now dares to name ‘blessed’. 23 Neither should the diagnosis of this ‘rupture’ be understood as suggesting that the objective of Scotus himself was to entail the immanentising forces his theological critics and atheistic followers conclude he did play a crucial role in unleashing. Rather the argument on behalf of a ‘Scotist rupture’ is an appraisal concerning – not what was entailed necessarily – but what was ‘made possible’ by the intellectual innovations of a figure who stood at a crossroads on the trajectory of Western religious thought. The passage from a metaphysics of participation – still felt in the analogical vision of Aquinas – passes through Scotus in a decisive way before it narrows towards the horizon of materialist atheism. As Catherine Pickstock writes:

The significance of Duns Scotus’ contribution is not that he is the sole inaugurator of transformations in theoretical speculation,

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23 John Duns Scotus was beatified by Pope John Paul II at St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome, March 20, 1992.
but rather that he is one figure among many – although a crucial one – in a general shift away from a focus upon the metaphysics of participation (which he tended to reduce to a matter of external imitation rather than intrinsic ‘sharing in’), and he is noteworthy in particular because he gave attention to these issues in a comprehensive fashion. No scholar could deny that such a shift occurred … Whatever one’s position with regard to specific texts, one must perhaps take a position in relation to this generally acknowledged shift away from participation and its relative importance or otherwise. Put briefly … Duns Scotus and his successors, within an approach seeking … for complex reasons to emphasise the sovereignty of God and the primacy of scripture, opened a space for univocal treatment of finite being without regard to theology, rational or otherwise. Although this space was not immediately exploited in a secularising fashion, in the long run this came to be the case.24

The claim, therefore, is that a univocal conception of being tends to contract the horizon of created being to an immanence lacking transcendent depth because no longer understood as participating necessarily in God. Further, the argument runs, created being in that it is now thinkable in abstraction from the cause from which it emanates (conceptually breached form the constitutive creator-creation relation), comes to be thought in terms self-enclosed and abstracted from the transcendent origin, which, in turn, results in a loss of the sense of the constitutive communion of creaturely participation as the mode of ‘horizontal’ inter-connectedness of creatures with each other. Moreover, in the subordination of God and creatures to an abstract category of ‘being’, what risks bearing the whole burden of distinguishing between God and creatures (and creatures with creatures) is an ‘intensity of being’ construed in terms of ‘power’ or ‘will’.25 Hence, whereas for

25 See Robert Barron, The Priority of Christ: Toward a Post-Liberal Catholicism (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2007), pp. 12–16. In these pages Barron briefly traces a genealogy of the voluntarism entailed by the Scotist ‘shift’, following it through the nominalism of William of Ockham, the arbitrary construal of divine power in Luther and Calvin, Kant’s self-legislation of the categorical imperative and ultimately to the Nietzschean ‘will to power’. All of this works to realise, as Barron notes, the fundamental relationship between liberal modernity and
Aquinas God wills the good in conformity with God’s wisdom which approves the good because God is goodness itself (i.e. what God wills is subject to God’s own ‘law’ of goodness);\(^\text{26}\) for Scotus, by contrast, God’s will is the cause of goodness sheerly by the fact of God’s willing it (i.e. whatever God wills is \textit{de facto} made ‘law’).\(^\text{27}\) God’s transcendence is thus construed more in the direction of ‘juridical sovereignty’ and less in terms of the gratuitous gift of being as given out of the source of being itself. This situation has led Pope Benedict XVI to register his own concern:

In contrast with the so-called intellectualism of Augustine and Thomas, there arose with Duns Scotus a voluntarism which, in its later developments, led to the claim that we can only know God’s \textit{voluntas ordinata}. Beyond this is the realm of God’s freedom, in virtue of which he could have done the opposite of everything he has actually done. This gives rise to positions which … might even lead to the image of a capricious God, who is not even bound to truth and goodness.\(^\text{28}\)

With these metaphysical issues in the background, I shall now explore how certain of Scotus’s theological innovations in the realm of Christology may further contribute to the trajectory of the ‘Scotist rupture’ towards a more secularised sense of the self and the world. But first, as a counterpoint to the Christology of Scotus, we turn to the Christology of Thomas Aquinas.

**Aquinas against \textit{homo assumptus} Christology**

Thomas Aquinas was the first scholastic of the Latin Middle Ages to quote directly from the conciliar texts of Ephesus (431), Chalcedon

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\(^{26}\) Cf. Aquinas, \textit{Summa theologiae} III, q. 2, a. 4, \textit{corpus}.


This alone constitutes an unsurpassably rich contribution of Aquinas to Latin Christology: he reawakened the ‘largely Greekless West’ to the inheritance of the Greek conciliar tradition. Positively, this recovery led Aquinas to take an increasingly ‘Cyrilline’ position on the unity of Christ. Negatively, it led Aquinas to take a progressively more hostile view of the Christology of his own age. Over the course of his life, Aquinas became convinced of Latin Christology’s perennial tendency to occupy a more or less ‘Nestorian’ position, especially to the extent that it tended to accommodate rather easily the homo assumptus position delineated by Peter Lombard, the first of Peter’s three so-called opiniones of the union of divinity and humanity in Christ.


32 Peter’s opiniones of union are: (i) the homo assumptus theory, (ii) the subsistence theory and (iii) the habitus theory, from which he reserved judgement concerning of the ‘orthodoxy’ of each, considering them equally valid ‘opinions’. See Bernhard Barth, ‘Ein neues Dokument zur Geschichte der frühscholastischen Christologie’, Theologische Quartalschrift 100 (1916), pp. 409–426. On the Lombard’s Christology, see Philipp W. Rosemann, Peter Lombard (Oxford: OUP, 2004), pp. 118–139; Lauge Olaf Nielsen, Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century: A Study of Gilbert Porret’s Thinking and the Theological Expositions of the Doctrine of the
The *homo assumptus* theory of Lombard is rooted broadly in the so-called ‘Antiochene school’ of Christology associated with Theodore of Mopsuestia (c. 350–428). In his theology of the *unio* of Christ, Theodore aimed to reconcile the Nicene emphasis on the *unum* Lord Jesus Christ (*e/(na Ku/rion  )Ihsou=n Xristo/n*) with his own sense of the Incarnation as an ‘indwelling’ (*e)noi/khsij*) of the Word in the ‘assumed’ (λαμβάνο) human being, viz. *homo assumptus*.³⁴ Peter does not cite Theodore, who nevertheless stands in the background of the theory he describes as holding that ‘in the Incarnation of the Word a … human being began to be God, not in the nature of God, but in the person of the Word’.³⁵

According to this theory, the union of divinity and humanity in Christ is established by a special ‘identity’ of essence between the Logos and the ‘assumed human being’, an identity rooted in the assumed human’s

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³³ To clarify: the so-called ‘Antiochene school’ (associated with Diodore, Theodore and Nestorius) is familiar to modern students of the development of Christological doctrine, who are used to contrasting this ‘school’ with its supposedly necessary counter point, the ‘Alexandrian school’ (associated with Athanasius and Cyril). However, as Andrew Louth has argued, the whole scheme of ‘a collision of two “schools” … more-or-less equivalent, broadly-based tendencies in forth-century theology’ is a myth of latter quasi-Hegelian construction (‘Why Did the Syrians reject the Council of Chalcedon?’ in Richard Price and Mary Whitby [eds], *Chalcedon in Context: Church Councils 400–700* [Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009], pp. 107–116, at p. 110). What is called the ‘Antiochene school’ may correspond to ideas passed on from master to disciple: Diodore to Theodore to Nestorius’ (p. 111), but it is representative of ‘none of the sense of some sort of compelling movement that the notion of a school suggests’ (p. 111). So when I write of the ‘so-called “Antiochene school”’ I mean nothing more than the common Christological tendency that can be associated with the three figures of Diodore, Theodore and Nestorius, which was always more marginal and idiosyncratic than the contemporary designation of a ‘school’ suggests. By contrast, the situation with the so-called ‘Alexandrian school’ is precisely the opposite: the thrust of the position associated with ‘Alexandria’ can be found throughout Greek theology: from the learned theology of the Cappadocians to the simple, though profound, insights of the author of the homilies attributed to St Macarius’ (p. 111) and is thus far more universal than the term ‘school’ tends to suggest.


³⁵ Peter Lombard, *Libri quattuor Sententiarum* III, dist. 6, ch. 2, no. 1.
receptivity to the abiding power of the Word. Thus the \textit{homo assumptus} theory offered by Peter Lombard tends to minimise the ontological unity of humanity and divinity in Christ to the extent that the particular property of a human nature – ‘a certain human being’ – is assumed into union with the divine person of the Son but not necessarily constituted in its \textit{supposition} by that person.

Aquinas was, from the time of his commentary on the Sentences in the 1250’s, suspicious of the \textit{homo assumptus} doctrine, which he initially judged merely contrary to the common opinion of tradition but not necessarily a repudiation of that tradition. However, over the course of his life, Aquinas increasingly became hostile to the \textit{homo assumptus} doctrine to the point that he finally rejected it \textit{tout court} as a condemnable re-emergence of Nestorianism. As Martin Morard has shown, this radicalisation of Aquinas’s position against the principle of \textit{homo assumptus} follows directly from the impact of his discovery, in the early 1260’s, of the acts of Constantinople II. Through his study of Constantinople II, Aquinas became emboldened in his condemnation of Christological dualism, to the point that, in his mature Christology, he rejects the \textit{homo assumptus} theory with the condemnation of the \textit{Anathematismi adversus „tria Capitula”} itself:

If anyone … tries to introduce into the mystery of Christ two suppositis (\textit{duas subsistentias}) or two persons (\textit{duas personas}) and then talks of one person only in respect to dignity, honour or adoration … let him be anathema. There has been no addition of person or subsistence to the Holy Trinity (\textit{nec enim adiectionem personae vel subsistentiae}) even after the incarnation of one of its members, God the Word.\footnote{Anathematismi adversus „tria Capitula”, V in Norman P. Tanner SJ (ed), \textit{Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, vol. 1, Nicea I – Lateran V}, (London: Sheed & Ward, 1990), p. 116 [The same in: \textit{Dokumenty Soborów Powszechnych}, ed. A. Baron, \textit{Martin Morard, ‘Une source de Saint Thomas d’Aquin: Le dixième concile de Constantinople (553)’}, \textit{Revue des science philosophiques et théologiques} 81 (1997), pp. 21–56. First cited in \textit{Contra Gentiles}, Aquinas’s Christology is increasingly informed and confirmed by the acts of the Constantinople II. Morard points to: \textit{De potentia}, q. 10, a. 4, ad 13; and q. 10, a. 4, ad 24; \textit{Lectura in Mattheum}, c. 1, l. 5; \textit{Expositio in Johannem}, c. 1, l. 7, nn. 171–172; c. 12, l. 7; \textit{Summa theologicae} III, q. 2, a. 1, ad i; q. 2, a. 3, corpus; q. 2, a. 6, corpus; q. 25, a. 1, sed contra; \textit{De unione Verbi incarnati}, a. 1, corpus; a. 2, corpus; \textit{Expositio super Psalmos}, prologue.}
Positively, for Aquinas, the logic of the doctrine of Constantinople II reinforced his own theology of the mode according to which the hypostatic unity of humanity and divinity in the Son must ontologically precede the individuation of the Son’s human nature. There can be, for Aquinas, no ‘human nature’ of Christ apart from its hypostatic union to the Word. This man ‘Jesus’ only exists as the divine person of the Son. The ‘newness’ of the Word becoming flesh thus occurs, for Aquinas, wholly on the side of the human nature in which the Son newly came to subsist. This means – rather shockingly under the new devotional attention to the particular humanity of Christ – that whatever particular ‘humanness’ there is in Jesus, this particularity is, nevertheless, only ‘real’ in virtue of the hypostatic unity of this nature to the person of the Word, such that the term of individuation of ‘this’ human nature simply is the divine filiation of the eternal Son. For Aquinas, therefore, there is no ‘human nature’ of Christ apart from that nature’s hypostatic union to the Word since, as Romanus Cessario puts, ‘the person of the Word pre-exists, Christ’s created human nature does not constitute his person but rather joins it’. In this way Aquinas, without using the language of ‘enhypostatos’ (ἐνυπόστατος), nevertheless came to exemplify the logic of that

H. Pietras, Kraków 2001, vol. 1, pp. 288–289]. Translation here modified. Aquinas cites this passage against homo assumptus Christology in De Union Verbi incarnati (a. 2, corpus) and in the Summa (III, q. 2, a. 3, corpus). In Expositio in Iohannem he refers to the Constantinople II against the homo assumptus theory, paraphrasing the anathema thus: Si quis in Domino Iesu Christo unam personam et duas hypostases dixerit, anathema sit (c. 1, l. 7, nn. 171–172).

38 Aquinas, Summa theologiae III, q. 2, a. 6, corpus.


40 Aquinas, Summa theologiae III q. 4, a. 2, ad 1; ad 2; and a. 5 ad 2.


42 Mistakenly attributed by Friedrich Loofs in the nineteenth-century to the patristic theologian Leontius of Byzantium, the doctrine of ‘enhypostatos’ became famously associated in the twentieth century with Karl Barth who, appealing to the patristic pedigree of the doctrine, in fact renovated it from Protestant Scholastic sources: see Friedrich Loofs, Leontius von Byzanz und die gleichnamigen Schriftsteller der griechischen Kirche, in Texte und Untersuchungen 3, ed. Oskar von Gebhardt and Adolf von Harnack (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrich’sche Buchhandlung, 1887); and
doctrine he knew and absorbed from John of Damascus. According to the logic of the doctrine, the ‘double existence of Christ’ (as Logos on the on hand, and as human being on the other) is foreclosed. The human nature of Christ only exists – only ‘subsists’ – insofar as it subsists in union with the hypostasis of the Word. As Ivor Davidson, the most important contemporary proponent of the doctrine of ‘enhypostatos’, puts it: ‘Jesus is a real man only as the Son of God ... [because] God particularizes the history of Jesus as God’s own’. Therefore, ‘the

logical Formula: from Leontius of Byzantium to Karl Barth’, Theological Studies 57 (1996), pp. 431–446. The confusions and objections surrounding ‘enhypostatos’ notwithstanding, a number of contemporary theologians have begun resourcing the doctrine beyond the terminological rigourism of patrology, showing that the logic of the doctrine does indeed (as Barth claimed) have deep patristic roots stretching back at least to Cyril of Alexandria: see Ivor Davidson, ‘Theologizing the Human Jesus: An Ancient (and Modern) Approach to Christology Reassessed’, International Journal of Systematic Theology 3 (2001), pp. 129–153, and ‘Reappropria-

43 John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa 3.9 (PG 94.1016C-1017B). Cf. Aqui-
nas, Summa theologiae III q. 2, aa. 2–3; III q. 17, aa. 1–2.
44 Davidson, ‘Theologizing the Human Jesus’, pp. 141 and 144.
humanity of Christ has no independent subsistence of its own but is hypostatic, or personally real, only as the human nature of the Son of God. The individuation of Christ’s human nature is therefore fully contingent on the enhypostatisation of the Logos. Or, as Aquinas put it, in the Incarnation ‘the eternal being of the divine Son (esse aeternum filii Dei) ... becomes the being of man (esse hominis), inasmuch as the human nature is assumed by the divine Son in the unity of person’. Thus every gesture towards granting the created nature of Jesus the status of an autonomously individuated existent (esse) involves a necessary shift towards a problematically dualistic position. There is only one esse in Christ, the divine esse of the eternal Son. Aquinas holds to this basic logic: the Incarnate Word is one subject subsisting hypostatically; and while the human nature of Jesus is a particular substance, it does not possess a propria personalitas and so cannot be another hypostasis or suppositum.

Against this dogmatic backdrop, Aquinas was compelled to judge the homo assumptus theory a variant of Nestorian heresy. And yet the homo assumptus theory remained un-condemned and thus an acceptable opinionem of Latin Christology. Broadly accepted in Aquinas’s day, the homo assumptus doctrine flourished moreover in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries among theologians of a so-called ‘Scotist’ variety.

**Haecceity and the particular Christ**

Writing a generation after Aquinas, John Duns Scotus conceived his Christology in qualified opposition to the single esse Christology of Aquinas. Whereas Aquinas was concerned to foreclose the heretical

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46 Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 17, a. 2, ad 2.
48 Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* III, q. 2, a. 3.
dualism he detected in the Lombardian homo assumptus doctrine, Scotus was motivated in his doctrine of the hypostatic union to resolve a different perplexity: How does Christ assume a human nature in atomo without assuming the ontological conditions of a particular human person? It is not that the unum of Christ is of no concern to Scotus, very much to the contrary. Neither is it the case that the particularity of Christ’s humanity is of no interest to Aquinas, the thirty three detailed questions of the Summa that make up the Vie de Jesus are evidence to the contrary.50 Rather the dichotomy between Aquinas and Scotus here lies, fundamentally, in two different starting points. Whereas Aquinas started from the divine unum of the humanity in the divine Logos, Scotus sought to account first for the particular distinction of the individual human nature of Jesus apart from direct appeal to that unum. Scotus’s solution to the perplexity he raised thus led him to perform, what Richard Cross has described as, ‘an explicit reification of Christ’s human nature’.51 Thus, whereas for Aquinas the hypostatic union so constitutes the ontological reality of Jesus’s humanity to the point that even the cadaver of Jesus in the tomb only ‘is’ to the extent that it is in unio with the divine Logos,52 for Scotus, by contrast, the hypostatic union does not constitute the reality and being of Jesus’s individuated human nature in any exceptional way such that the ‘Word could put off his human nature without anything absolute in it being destroyed’.53 In other words, for Scotus, it was in principle possible that Jesus could have existed apart from the hypostatic union.

Drawing on the Damascene’s notion of Christ’s human nature as a nature assumed in atomo,54 Scotus held that the human nature assumed by the Logos must conform to the definition of human nature given in all other cases: an instantiation of human nature defined exclusively in terms applicable to the hypostatic union would not suffice. This led Scotus to offer two innovations into the mediaeval theology of his

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50 Aquinas, Summa theologiae III, qq. 27–59.
52 Aquinas, Summa theologiae III, q. 50, a. 2.
53 Duns Scotus, Quodlibetum, 19, n. 21.
(1) Scotus proposed a new conception of ‘individuation’ that does not define individuality either as a material or an accidental feature of being, but rather as a quasi-essential aspect of being, not in the sense of ‘pertaining to the order of essence’ but rather as a kind of formality (but not a ‘form’); this aspect Scotus called haecceitas (‘thisness’).  

(2) Scotus sought to demonstrate how an individuated rational nature need not itself be conceived as a person, but instead could be the nature of another kind of person (i.e. a fully individuated nature could be assumed by a person of another nature). Thus beyond the traditional Chalcedonian distinction of natura (φύσις) and persona / suppositum (ὑπόστασις), Scotus introduced haecceitas as a ‘third term’ of distinction midway between the traditional two. Further, he conceived haecceitas as actualising nature in such a way that a human nature could now be conceivably individuated without necessarily being a person. Indeed Scotus would thus drain persona of the prior ontological density it traditionally entailed, now imputing this directly to the haecceity of haec natura, the ultimate positive constituent of existing being. In this way Scotus attempted to avoid both the exceptionalism he perceived in Aquinas’s single esse doctrine and the problem of Nestorianism. But this he achieved at a price. As Louis Dupré argues: the effect of ‘Scotus’s solution’ was to detach human ‘nature’ from its traditional link with ‘a divine destiny’ such that, in contrast to the patristic sense of human nature ordered to theosis,

Scotus’s nature remains neutral with respect to destiny: either it may be assumed into an adoptive sonship of God in grace, or it may follow its normal course to the formation of a purely natural human person. Thus, in Scotus’s artificial construction, intended to protect the concept of human nature from breaking under the weight of

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57 Duns Scotus, Lectura III, dist. 1, q. 1, nn. 35–47.

58 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio III, dist. 1, q. 1.
a theological exception, the actual person who bears that nature is no more than an indifferent, contingent addition to it. 59

Two consequences follow from this: (1) Nature / immanence is now ‘abstracted’ from the supernatural / transcendent such that the attendant metaphysical dualism of the doctrine of *natura pura* is now thinkable. 60 (2) Personhood is now reconceived in terms of an ontological minimalism having to do with (voluntaristic) ‘power’ over oneself.

Scotus’s distinctive contribution to the conception of the person lies in the way he re-interprets Richard of St Victor’s doctrine of *incommunicabilis*,


60 Cf. Bok, *et al.*, ’More Than Just An Individual’, p. 186: ’For Scotus … in human nature there is no tendency to depend on God (to be an incarnation of God); nor is obediential potency for dependence a kind of inclination or openness to be fulfilled. So whether or not there is a desiderium naturale in human nature, to Scotus’s mind it is not connected with incarnation’ (emphasis is Bok, *et al.*’s). Bok, *et al.* make this argument in direct opposition to early twentieth century ‘Scotists’ (such as Déodat de Basly) who mistakenly considered Scotus’s position on the disposition of dependence of Christ’s human nature as an actualisation of the natural inclination of human nature to the supernatural. As Bok, *et al.* show, the contrary is the case for Scotus: the hypostatic union does not technically reveal the ordering of human nature to the supernatural and Christ is *not* the exemplar of humanity’s supernatural destiny. And yet, Scotus does, in some sense, have a doctrine of the natural desire of the human being to the supernatural. In contrast to neo-Thomism, moreover, there is in Scotus an appetitus naturalis of the human to beatitude – hence Henri de Lubac’s famous deployment of Scotus’s notion of the indispositus of human nature to the supernatural in support of his thesis of the désir naturel du surnaturel (cf. *Le Mystère du surnaturel* [Paris: Aubier, 1965], pp. 116–117, 151–152 and 242–244). However, the extent to which Scotus’s indispositus supports the full depth and implication of de Lubac’s position is another matter altogether. First of all, de Lubac never held – as Scotus and Jansenius *did* – that ‘supernatural vision’ is the ‘natural end’ of the human creature. For de Lubac, by contrast, following what he understood as the classical position of the Fathers held also by Aquinas, human nature is itself a paradox: aporetically this ‘nature’ possesses no ‘natural’ finis ultimus but is created, rather, for the ‘supernatural’ finis ultimus of *visio Dei*, which can only arrive as a gift of grace. Second of all, as Alan Wolter has pointed out, the appetitus naturalis of Scotus is not an act or operation but simply the term of ‘an ontological relationship between any faculty (of the soul) and that which perfects it. … [Therefore] to speak of the natural appetite for beatitude as a “desire” or a “longing” … is to use purely metaphorical language’ (Allan B. Wolter OFM, ‘Duns Scotus on the Natural Desire for the Supernatural’, in *The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus* [London: Cornell University Press, 1990], pp. 125–147, here at pp. 140–41). Wolter’s hereby suggests that the appetitus
configuring it now in terms of *independentia*. On Scotus’s innovation, the anarchic irreplaceability of personal singularity is compressed into ‘perseity’ in order to open the ontological field of *haecceitas*, thus *persona* is reconceived as a self-sufficing autonomy of ‘independent existence, free of any inclination to exist dependently’. This is how Scotus conceived the *ultima solitudo* that, for him, defines the human person in terms of a double freedom: (i) freedom from ‘actual’ dependence, and (ii) freedom from ‘dispositional’ dependence. Accordingly, Richard’s definition is now mobilised in a very particular direction, which points back to another theological source: the fifth-century semi-Pelagian, Faustus of Riez.

*naturalis* of Scotus is in fact closer to a species of the ‘obediential potency’ de Lubac was criticising than it is to the *désir naturel du surnaturel* de Lubac was proposing – closer, that is, to ‘velleity’ than to the full blooded *quelque chose de Dieu* characteristic of the Lubacian thesis. In part the issue here turns on the complex way Scotus prioritises ‘will’ over ‘reason’, thus distinguishing the ordination of the will to the supernatural from the ordination of the intellect, which for Scotus is not ordained to the supernatural (Wolter, ‘Duns Scotus on the Natural Desire for the Supernatural’, pp. 131–139). This leads to a problematic situation in which, as Rudi te Velde has shown, Scotus, in contrast to Aquinas, holds that there is no inclination in human nature to self-transcendency even while there is (aporetically) an inclination of the will to a transcendent object (viz. supernatural ‘beatitude’). This makes no sense of the intellectual yearning of de Lubac, which even while it is an inclination of being, is fundamentally a yearning for universality in the form of divine illumination. Scotus’s declension from the doctrine of divine illumination coupled with his resistance to emphasise any inclination to self-transcendency within the human person allows him to posit a God willed ‘sufficiency’ of finite being. Yet, for the human being, how can this be? How can human nature desire a transcendent beatitude without that desire being an inclination to self-transcendency? As te Velde shows, for Scotus the transcendent good is naturally willed – incredibly! – as an immanent good, and therefore not under the condition of any self-transcending élan of nature to the supernatural (see te Velde, ‘*Natura In Seipsa Recurva Est*: Duns Scotus and Aquinas on the Relationship between Nature and Will’, pp. 155–170). Dissociated from the *convenientia* of the Incarnation on the one hand, and conceived in terms of a desire for an immanent good rather than ‘illumination’ on the other, Scotus’s *appetitus naturalis* cannot be properly described as a transcending *desiderium naturale* to deification, a constitutive infrastructure of nature to open from within to what utterly transcends nature.

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63 Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, dist 1, q. 1, n. 1, and *Quodlibetum*, 19, n. 19.
In contrast to the ‘ontological’ conceptions of *persona* offered by Boethius and Richard, Faustus offered a ‘juridical’ model. For Faustus, person signifies a ‘right of power’. What does this mean? It means that if a person holds power over another (such as a ‘father’ over a ‘son’, or a ‘master’ over ‘slave’), the ‘personhood’ of that other is ‘consumed’ by the legal power of the one under whom the other is subjected legally. For Faustus this follows since one juridical unit, as he understands it, can be made of many substances and yet itself constitute only one ‘person’ because the many substances are submissive to one dominating agent. On this scheme personhood is conceived in strictly voluntaristic terms, and thus deracinated from the ontological categories of ‘nature’ and ‘substance’. As Faustus puts it: ‘the person is juridical in the same way as a substance is natural’ (*persona res juris est substantia res naturae*).

Faustus’s alternative theology of the person was taken up through the Council of Frankfurt (794) by William of Auxerre at the beginning of the thirteenth century. William absorbed the Faustusian conception of the person into his ‘negation doctrine’ in order to answer negatively the question as to whether ‘this’ human Jesus was a human person. According to William’s doctrine, the difference between *hic homo* and *hic homo persona* lies in a negation of properties such that a person is simply an individual human nature in ‘the state of not being united to a higher thing’. Thus

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65 Faustus of Riez, *De Spiritu Sancto* (PL 62.9B-40A).
66 Faustus’s ‘juridical’ conception of person was articulated especially through a quasi-Nestorian reflection on ‘two substances’ in Christ. As Richard Cross summarises it: ‘The reason he suggests for this is that two substances cannot be combined into one – particularly if one is created and the other uncreated. But it is possible for one person to be made ostensibly two persons on the grounds that ‘person’ does not have the same kind of *ontological* meaning as “substance” has. “Person” refers to some kind of *juridical* status, such that a person is, say, responsible (i.e., has dominion over) for the acts of the whole’ (Cross, ‘The Doctrine of the Hypostatic Union in the Thought of Duns Scotus’, p. 100).
William links ‘perseity’ with ‘dignity’ in a straightforward way such that ‘person’ now consists of an incommunicable individual plus the distinction of ‘dignity’ which is now perfectly convertible with ‘perseity’: ‘What guarantees perseity is the distinction of dignity. And the distinction of dignity is identified as the state of non-assumption by the Word’.\(^71\) Faustian juridical autonomy in this way becomes internal to how William conceives the personal unity of Christ: the human nature of Jesus fails to be a ‘person’ because it is lacking the dignity of ‘perseity’, which has now replaced ‘rationality’ as the term specifying the *nomen dignitatis* of personhood.

Indebted to the Faustian conception of the person (as he received it through William’s ‘negation doctrine’), Scotus fuses the juridical conception of the person with the incommunicability of *ultima solitudo* configured as *independentia*.\(^72\) Of course, there is little reason to think that Scotus drew on the Faustian genealogy for its own sake. Scotus was not interested to articulate a more autonomous version of personhood for sociological, political, metaphysical or even abstract theological reasons. Rather, the Faustian conception in the form of the ‘negation doctrine’ is deployed by Scotus concretely for the sake of the expediency with which it safeguards the formal *unio* of the Incarnate Christ while, at the same time, offering ontological latitude from which to introduce the semi-substantial notion of haecceity, which Scotus thought necessary to uphold the ontological integrity of *hic homo*. The unwitting result of promoting this Faustian conception of the person lies in its ‘proto-liberal’ privileging of agency (*agere*) and right (*ius*) over being (*esse*).\(^73\) This new ‘proto-liberal’ conception of the person ends by collapsing the mystery of the dignity of the person into ‘perseity’ thereby exhausting the person of its apophatic, rational and complex relational elements, what Henri de Lubac called the person’s ‘unstable ontological constitution’.\(^74\)

\(^{71}\) Cross, ‘The Doctrine of the Hypostatic Union in the Thought of Duns Scotus’, p. 103.


\(^{73}\) And this moreover insofar as Scotus’s conception of the person links up with the very sharp distinction he draws more generally between ‘will’ and ‘nature’. See te Velde ‘*Natura In Seipsa Recurva Est*’, pp. 155–170; and Boulois, *Être et représentation*, pp. 205–212.

\(^{74}\) De Lubac, *Le Mystère du surnaturel*, p. 149.
'Scotistic' *homo assumptus* Christology

The ontological minimalism of Scotus’s conception of the hypostatic union laid the foundations for a misconstrual of his doctrine by later ‘Scotists’, who interpreted the Subtle Doctor in terms of a reinvigorated and openly *homo assumptus* doctrine.\(^{75}\) Absorbing Cartesian and post-Renaissance concerns for the status of Jesus’s human ‘subjectivity’, the French Franciscan Christologist Déodat de Basly extended Scotus’s ‘reification’ of human nature to accommodate a psychological ‘reification’ which implied for him something like a parallel human ‘self’ in the God-Man.\(^{76}\) For Déodat, the *haecceitas* of *hic homo* legitimises two autonomous ‘egos’ in the Incarnate Christ. Thus the humanity of Jesus could be said to constitute an individual human being with a human ‘I’ distinct from the ‘I’ of the Word yet formally ‘united’ to the Word according to the doctrine of negation. Déodat’s extension of Scotus, moreover, was articulated in terms of a self-described *homo assumptus* position (which he wrongly attributed to Scotus himself). This, coupled with Scotus’s notion of Christ’s human nature as in principle fully individuated apart from its union with the Word, justified for Déodat a reapplication of the patristic doctrine of the communication of idioms in terms of a parallelism in which it was now possible to apply the doctrine ‘indirectly’ (*communicatio idiomatum in obliquo*). In this way Déodat seems to have suggested that Christ should be thought of as more fundamentally *duo* than *unum*. All of this was taken up and extended by Déodat’s confrère, Léon Seiller, who argued that Jesus had a genuine human ‘psychological personality’.\(^{77}\) In these terms, in the case of Seiller, we see a distinct move towards a full-blown two-Sons Christology where the relation of two ‘psychological personalities’ are


treated as autonomously predicable ‘subjects’. As Seiller argues, in Jesus, ‘God the Word is the subject adored, in no way the subject adoring … the subject prayed to, in no way the subject praying’.  

The speculative questions raised by Déodat and Seiller concerning the status of the human psychology of Christ need not entail a heterodox position. If one specifies the ontological enhypostatisation of the human ‘psychology’ of Christ by the divine Logos such that the Logos itself wholly constitutes that ‘psychology’, one can, then, make a speculative distinction from which to speak of something like the human ‘psychological personality’ of Jesus. Christ is truly human according to the patristic axiom ‘that which is not assumed is not healed’; and the tradition holds that he has a fully human ‘will’, which implies that he possesses likewise a fully human ‘memory’, ‘imagination’ and even ‘consciousness’. As John of Damascus writes:

[Corresponding to his two natures he has the twofold set of natural properties belonging to the two natures – two natural wills, the divine and the human; two natural operations, a divine and a human; two natural freedoms, a divine and a human; and wisdom and knowledge, both divine and human.]

However, raising these aspects of ‘full humanity’ requires, as Thomas Joseph White has shown, careful and full analogical submission to the dyothelite doctrine of Constantinople III (680–681). Key to a properly orthodox inquiry into the ‘psychology’ or ‘consciousness’ of Christ’s human nature requires attention, therefore, to the mode by which the natural operations of Christ’s human mind function only as constituted within (and in full submission to) the unity of Christ’s divine person. This means that the speculative distinction of human

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81 John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa 3.13 (PG 94.133A).
consciousness, which is recognised by faith and thereby sanctioned as a valid notional question, nevertheless cannot be specified as intelligible existentially to us, as if that human consciousness possessed an autonomous ontological status. Christ can only be perceived and spoken of as a concrete unity. Faith specifies (1) that he is the divine Logos, and (2) that he possesses two fully operative and distinct natures. Déodat and Seiller, unwittingly or not, posed these valid notional questions as if they were existential questions, and thus in terms that radically undermine the ontological and subjective unity of the Incarnate Christ, thus departing from a fundamental precept of orthodox Christology. If a homo assumptus tendency was a latent risk internal to Scotus’s innovative quasi-Theodorian reification of Christ’s human nature, the innovation became openly Nestorian in Seiller.

The radicalisation of Scotistic Christology in Déodat and Seiller led finally to the censure of Pope Pius XII in Sempiternus Rex (1951). Published on the 1500th anniversary of the Council of Chalcedon, the encyclical reaffirmed Cyrilline orthodoxy in terms of a tacit condemnation of this late Christological Scotism. Accordingly Pius wrote against those who,

desert the ancient teachings more than is right, and make an erroneous use of the authority of the definition of Chalcedon to support their new ideas. These emphasize the state and condition of Christ’s human nature to such an extent as to make it seem something existing in its own right, and not as subsisting in the Word itself. But the council of Chalcedon in full accord with that of Ephesus, clearly asserts that both natures are united in ‘one person and subsistence’, and rules out the placing of two individuals in Christ, as if some homo assumptus, completely autonomous in itself, is placed by the side of the Word.

In no uncertain terms the doctrine of homo assumptus was rejected. This magisterial judgement was reiterated in 2006 by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, which described homo assumptus Christology as ‘incompatible with the Catholic faith which affirms the unity of the person of Jesus Christ in two natures, divine and human,

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according to the formulations of the Council of Ephesus, and above all of the Council of Chalcedon’.  

MAIOR DISSIMILITUDO AND CHRISTOLOGICAL UNIO

In the first place Sempiternus Rex sets a dogmatic limit that forecloses the later extension of Scotus by ‘homo assumptus Scotists’. To be clear, Scotus himself does not fall under the Pian condemnation. Nevertheless, beyond the dogmatic limit of Sempiternus Rex, the encyclical can be read as an invitation to return more fundamentally to a Cyrilline notion of the unio of Christ. Pope Pius holds up, in this regard, the Christology of Thomas Aquinas:

He who descended, this is the same as he who ascended. By these words is signified the unity of the person of God and man. For the Son of God came down by taking human nature, but the Son of Man ascended according to his human nature to the sublimity of eternal life. And so he is the same Son of God who came down and Son of Man who went up.

In this light, the Cyrilline unity of Christ as it was articulated within the conciliar tradition and received by Aquinas is magisterially reaffirmed and offered as the fundamental soil of orthodox Christological speculation, which animated not only the traditional understanding of Jesus Christ but determined at the same time the classical Christian account of the relation of God and creation.

Robert Sokolowski has argued that even while the ‘main focus of the early [Christological] councils … was on the being and the actions of Jesus’, through the emergent grammar of Christological orthodoxy ‘the church … determined its understanding of God and of the relationship between God and the world’. Sokolowski writes:

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86 Thomas Aquinas, Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Ephesios, c. 4, l. 3, circa finem. As quoted in Pius XII, Sempiternus Rex, 33.
The Council of Chalcedon, and the councils and controversies that led up to it, were concerned with the mystery of Christ, but they also tell us about the God who became incarnate in Christ. They tell us first that God does not destroy the natural necessities of things he becomes involved with, even in the intimate union of the incarnation.\(^{88}\)

Traditional Christology thus affirms that proximity with God to the point of *unio* enhances and does not weaken the integrity of a particular created nature. This Christological insight has deep implications for how we conceive the metaphysical distinction that must nevertheless maintain between God and individual created beings. Sokolowski terms this the ‘Christian distinction’, which involves the denial that God in his divinity is part of or dependent on the world.\(^{89}\) In a phrase, the entailment of conciliar Christology necessitates that ‘the Christian God is … not a “kind” of being at all’.\(^{90}\) This makes possible a rethinking of the relation of God and creation such that ‘difference’ and ‘unity’ can now perfectly coincide (*inconfusa, immutabiliter, indivise, inseparabiliter*). Because humanity is truly accomplished in the hypostatic unity of *this* human nature subsisting wholly in the person of the Son of God, therefore the relation of the human being to God is not one in which the integrity of humanity is compromised by *unio*; but to the contrary, union with God perfects the difference (*maior dissimilitudo*) that nevertheless paradoxically maintains between God and creation.\(^{91}\)

Having offered the ‘Christian distinction’ and all that it entails about God and the relation of God and the world, Sokolowski suggests that all ‘Christological heresies are a reflection of tendencies to make pagan the Christian sense of the divine’.\(^{92}\) What does it mean to ‘make pagan’ the Christian God? For Sokolowski it means conceiving the distinction between God and creatures as one between ‘beings’ that exist on the same plane of being. While the ‘Christian distinction’ entails that ‘the world or the whole itself is placed as one of the terms of … distinction’,\(^{93}\)


\(^{90}\) Sokolowski, *The God of Faith and Reason*, p. 36.


\(^{92}\) Sokolowski, *The God of Faith and Reason*, p. 36.

in ‘pagan religion’ all distinctions are made ‘within the context of the world or the whole, the matrix of being in which one thing comes forward as differentiated from others’. On the pagan scheme (of which the modern liberal scheme is a variant), sameness and otherness, the one and the many, God and the world relate always and only ‘within a setting that is ultimate’. Within this ‘ultimate’ setting, terms of distinction are distinguishable to the extent (and only to the extent) that they simply ‘are not’ what they are distinguishable from. In other words, difference is ‘contrastive’ and ‘competitive’: difference decreases to the extent that union is achieved, while union is compromised in proportion to the actualisation of a distinguishable difference of one term in relation to another. Thus within the logic of ‘pagan religion’ (and secular liberalism), the distinction of one being from another is established by a ‘relation of otherness’.

On the Christian logic of the relation of God and the world, by contrast, the difference between the creator and the creature involves, most fundamentally, the fact that creation only ‘is’ in relation to God, while God ‘is’ in himself and therefore irrespective of every relation to created reality. Sokolowski writes:

[I]n the Christian distinction God is understood as ‘being’ God entirely apart from any relation of otherness to the world or to the whole. God could and would be God even if there were no world. Thus the Christian distinction is appreciated as a distinction that did not have to be, even though it in fact is. The most fundamental thing we come to in Christianity, the distinction between the world and God, is appreciated as not being the most fundamental thing after all, because one of the terms of the distinction, God, is more fundamental than the distinction itself.

On this logic, uncreated ‘oneness’ is more fundamental than created ‘difference’ (which is perfected in its integrity by proximity to the divine); or better, divine ‘oneness’ is the first term of the integrity and perfectibility of created ‘difference’. Hence, Aquinas’s doctrine of ‘mixed relation’, whereby God is not related to the world by any real relation,

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while the world ‘is’ only by virtue of its real relation to God. As Aquinas’s doctrine of the single divine esse of Christ confirms, the hypostatic union of the Son constitutes his human reality (which does not exist apart from its union with the Logos), so analogously with the ‘mixed relation’ of creation, the ipsum esse per se subsistens of God constitutes creation, which ‘is’ and subsists only by participation in the ‘oneness’ of God. In both cases, the maior dissimilitudo of created being (whether of the human nature of Jesus or the creaturely being of the world) is constituted by and perfected within a non-contrastive communion in which union differentiates. Unio is the ground of maior dissimilitudo. This logic of unity as the first term of differentiation is, moreover, in the Christological context, concretely Cyrilline.

The Cyrilline sense of union as the first term of differentiation entails an analogical emphasis in which there can be no ‘third term’ situated midway ‘between’ the maior dissimilitudo of God and created beings. Authentic communion requires a conception of being and the person, therefore, in which the nomen dignitatis is actualised and perfected, not through the autonomy or ‘perseity’ of an individual being, but through the anteriorly receptive disposition of being’s participation in the source of being (ipsum esse per se subsistens). Hence, for Aquinas, as Karol Wojtyła puts it, ‘the person is perfectissimum ens’.

Conclusion

According to Catherine Pickstock, ‘univocity involves necessarily a logic of self-possession’, a logic fundamentally ‘at variance with the theological notion that being in its very existence is donum’. The theological convertibility of gift and being requires that being is understood in the first place as an anterior givenness, being ‘is’ because it is receptive to a superior ‘other’. This then entails that the perfection of being too is rooted in gift, in self-gift and in receptivity, of recognising oneself as being— from another

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97 Cf. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 13, a 7, corpus; q. 28, a 1, ad 3; *De veritate*, q. 4, a. 5, corpus; q. 3, a. 3, corpus.
100 Pickstock, *Duns Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary Significance*, p. 553.
and called to being-for an ‘other’. Hence the Second Vatican Council’s declaration that ‘man ... cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself’.101 This convertibility of gift and being confirms fundamentally what Pickstock calls the ‘contradictory space of participation’: the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ are not first of all contrastive terms, but rather communion is perfective of difference. On her reading, a univocal conception of being tends to call all of this into question: ‘If each finite position does not occupy the problematic (even, one can admit) contradictory space of participation, then it is identical with its own space’.102

The fundamental Christological presumption of homo assumptus Christology is that the human being is ‘identical with its own space’ and therefore the unio of God and man in Christ can only be formal. As we have seen, Aquinas held precisely the opposite view: the esse of the Logos constitutes the very existence of the human nature of Christ. In this light, the Pian condemnation of homo assumptus Christology in itself forces us to rethink esse and the metaphysical entailment of the hypostatic union. That is, it urges us to return to a more Cyrilline sense of the unity of Christ, and thereby to resource afresh a participational and paradoxical sense of esse compatible with the single divine esse of Christ. In the first place this return is necessitated by the dogmatic limit set by Sempiternus Rex, but beyond the dogmatic limit this return proves an exigency to re-think again the person beyond every juridical reduction. Here the first key lies in Aquinas’s axiom persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura.103 In this light persona is the most expansive term of being because it is the highest perfection of being.104 And if this is the case, the hypostatic union of human nature constituted by the divine persona of the Son is itself the revelation of human personality at its highest pitch.

David L. Schindler has argued that the essential mark of the modern liberal conception of the person concerns the person as a capacity to act on his own initiative.105 Schindler writes:

101 Gaudium et spes, 24.
103 Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 29, a. 3, corpus.
104 Cf. Karol Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility, trans. H. T. Willetts (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), p. 22: ‘The term persona has been coined to signify that a man cannot be wholly contained within the concept “individual member of the species”, but that there is something more to him, a particular richness and perfection in the manner of his being, which can only be brought out by the use of the word “person”.
105 See Schindler, Heart of the World Center of the Church, pp. 275–279.
liberalism typically carries a definite sense of the primacy of human agency or ‘construction’ in the self’s affective-volitional and cognitive relations with God and others ... That is, the emphasis in such relations is disproportionately on both the individual self and the individual self’s doing and making. ¹⁰⁶

Against this liberal notion of personhood, Schindler contrasts what he conceives of as an authentically Catholic and theological notion of personhood revealed in Christ’s filiation and the fact that creatures are insofar as they are ‘from’ (esse-ab) God:

Creatures are first from God: they image the divine communio personarum through the initiative of God in Jesus Christ, and are thus born of God’s love. ... The meaning and the dignity of creatures therefore lie most fundamentally not in something creatures themselves do but in what they are: in the very being that they first receive. Being receptive of God’s love is the fundamental fact about created being, the constitutive condition of being.¹⁰⁷

On this scheme, communal participation precedes every autonomous act such that the most basic exigence of personhood is ‘to receive what has always-already been given’.¹⁰⁸ This filial sense of personhood runs strictly counter to the liberal accent of personhood, which privileges in all things agere over esse.

On his own terms, Scotus unequivocally avoids the error of Nestorianism (however later Scotists misconstrued his doctrine). The distinction he makes, however, between the haecceity of the individual human nature of Jesus on the one hand, and the suppositum of his divine person on the other, avoids Nestorianism to the extent precisely that the category of persona is reconfigured in a juridical direction, that is, as essentially dissociated from esse. While we ought to allow that Scotus was motivated by the good Christological intention to avoid Nestorianism on the one hand, while preserving knowledge of the particularity of the world and of Christ’s Incarnation on the other, in retrospect we can see that his need to de-ontologise the mystery of the person (coupled with

¹⁰⁶ Schindler, Heart of the World Center of the Church, p. xiv; italics are Schindler’s.
¹⁰⁷ Schindler, Heart of the World Center of the Church, p. xv; italics are Schindler’s.
¹⁰⁸ Schindler, Heart of the World Center of the Church, p. 277.
a new stress on the ‘individual’ and the priority of the ‘will’) anticipates the problematic liberal ethos of *sui iuris*. Nestorianism is avoided, but only to the extent, it would seem, that the *nomen dignitatis* of the person is deracinated from being and given over to juridical perseity.

The alternative here is to follow *Sempiternus Rex*, beyond the dogmatic limit it set, into the radical *unio* of the Cyrilline Christology it proposed as expressed in Aquinas’s doctrine of the single *esse* of Christ. If, for Aquinas, ‘the person is *perfectissimum ens*’,¹⁰⁹ then it is precisely in the singularity of Christ’s *esse* that we find the key to the mystery of the person. Here the filiation of the Son is the first term of a receptive and Christological notion of human personhood, an idea of the human person that inevitably leads into the paradox the ‘contradictory space of participation’. The truth of the human person, in this light, lies in the *unum* of the Incarnate Son and the impossible *donum* of participation in his *persona mystica*¹¹⁰.


¹¹⁰ This paper has benefited from the generous and critical comments of colleagues: Conor Cunningham, Johannes Hoff, Karen Kilby and Adrian Walker. All errors are my own.