Alexander I. Vvedensky
On the Kinds of Faith with Reference to Knowledge (I)

The article is a Polish translation of the first two chapters of Vvedensky’s work *On the Kinds of Faith with Reference to Knowledge*. This work was first published in Russian journal “The Problems of Philosophy and Psychology” in 1894. In the first chapter of Vvedensky’s work the author concentrates on Rationalism and its relation to faith. The second chapter considers criticism and its connection with faith. The next chapter discusses these kinds of faith which are recognized by the critical reason. The starting point of Vvedensky’s work was a controversial article of Peter A. Kalenov. The philosopher distinguishes three main kinds of faith with reference to the reason: “naïve”, “blind” and “conscious”. In fact, “blind” and “conscious” faith are the same kind of faith, according to Vvedensky. Hume’s discovery is essential to Vvedensky’s problem. “Hume’s principle” says that a cause forms a bond with an act of a synthetic character (i.e. not subject to rationalisation), and it is cognized by us with the help of a previous or more recent experience. An obligation to consider both the statement A and the statement non-A as equally acceptable is a consequence of cognition of Hume’s principle. These statements are not at variance with logic or facts of experience. The Russian philosopher aims to clear the reason of dogmatic tinges. He agrees with Kant’s opinion that pure experience does not give any certain generalizations. Since the law of contradiction has an *a priori* meaning, this law does not extend to things-in-themselves, such as God. The translation of the following part of Vvedensky’s work will appear in the following issues of “Logos i Ethos”.