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Ludwig Wittgenstein's Progressive Antimetaphysicism (II)

The present paper is the last part of the two-piece article which concerns Ludwig Wittgenstein's antimetaphysicism. It begins dealing with so the called tractarian ontology of simple objects and a logical form. Subsequently, I consider the problem of the sense of the *Tractatus* itself which recognizes its own theses as nonsensical. This curious situation can be interpreted in two different ways and I sketch both of them. Then I move on to the reasons of Wittgenstein's rejection of the *Tractatus* in *Some Remarks of Logical Form* and the process of forging the new idea of the language. The main goal of the last part of my article was to show the roots of the famous language-game concept in 19th century's mathematical formalism of Thomae and Heine.